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Abstract- The evolutionary nature of Unmanned and 
Autonomous systems of systems (UASoS) acquisition needs 
to be matched by evolutionary test capabilities yet to be 
developed.  As part of this effort we attempt to understand 
the cost and risk considerations for UASoS Test and 
Evaluation (T&E) and propose the development of a 
parametric cost model to conduct trade-off analyses.  This 
paper focuses on understanding the need for effort 
estimation for UASoS, the limitations of existing cost 
estimation models, and how our effort can be merged with 
the cost estimation processes.  We present the 
prioritization of both technical and organizational cost 
drivers.  We note that all drivers associated with time 
constraints, integration, complexity, understanding of 
architecture and requirements are rated highly, while 
those regarding stakeholders and team cohesion are rated 
as medium.  We intend for our cost model approach to 
provide management guidance to the T&E community in 
estimating the effort required for UASoS T&E. 
Keywords- Unmanned and Autonomous Systems of Systems, 
Test and Evaluation, Cost, Risk, Complexity 
 
1 Introduction 
 The development of Unmanned and Autonomous 
Systems (UAS) has increased exponentially over the years 
and at the same time has challenged traditional testing and 
evaluation (T&E) processes.  UAS’s provide amazingly 
new tactical abilities to the warfighter including mission 
assurance, command and control.  [1] In addition, they 
never operate alone.  They are always part of an integrated 
and well connected network of system of systems. This 
means that the constituent UASs are both operationally 
independent (most or all of the constituent systems can 
perform useful functions both within the SoS and outside of 
the SoS) and managerially independent (most or all of the 
constituent systems are managed and maintained for their 
own purposes).  [2] 
The evolutionary nature and greater demand for 
Unmanned and Autonomous systems of systems (UASoS) 
acquisition needs to be matched by evolutionary test 
capabilities yet to be developed.  For example, the Predator, 
which the US Air Force considers a system of four aircraft, 
a ground control station, and other pertinent equipment, 
failed Operational T&E, and still went on to be a huge 
success in the battlefield.  Granted, T&E recommendations 
were overridden, and while Predator did not meet its 
performance requirements there is lack in T&E processes to 
recognize levels of effectiveness.  To override T&E 
recommendations for every system is not advised but there 
is need for improved T&E processes.  [1]  
Testing at the SoS level focuses on the interactions 
between the SoS constituents and the emergent behaviors 
that result from the complex interactions between the 
constituent systems. [2]  There is also no standard method 
to  determine how much testing effort is required nor is 
there the ability to begin making effective contingency 
plans should testing requirements change.  The Prescriptive 
and Adaptive Testing Framework (PATFrame), currently 
under development, uses knowledge acquisition to 
minimize risk through a decision support system.  As part 
of this effort we attempt to understand the cost and risk 
considerations for UASoS T&E and propose the 
development of a parametric cost model to conduct trade-
off analyses for T&E.   
We use a risk and cost approach because we recognize 
that on a SoS level, there must be a comprehensive analysis 
of complexity to understand its impact on the cost of 
systems and to avoid unreliable estimates and unfavorable 
system performance.  This process can also produce 
strategic options to improve the confidence of cost 
estimators and stakeholders in making better decisions, 
even in the face of complexity, risk, and uncertainty.  [3] 
Developing any cost or resource estimation model for 
T&E requires a fundamental understanding of existing cost 
estimation techniques, how they have evolved over the 
years and how they can be leveraged for the purpose of 
T&E of UASoS.  This paper focuses on understanding the 
need for better estimation of the test effort for UASOS, 
what cost and risk considerations must be addressed 
  
specifically for the UASoS T&E and how other approaches 
may be limited in addressing the specific issues of T&E of 
UASoS.  The work presented here is a combination of 
information collected from various normative and 
descriptive views of testing based on literature review, 
surveys, and interviews with members of the DoD 
community, both those directly and indirectly involved in 
the T&E process.  We discuss in more detail the risks and 
costs we have identified, and explore the ways our findings 
can be merged with current cost estimation processes.  We 
intend for our approach to provide management guidance to 
the DoD T&E community in estimating the effort required 
for test and evaluation of inter-related unmanned and 
autonomous systems in the context of SoS. 
 
2 T&E of UASoS 
UASoS represent a new type of technology with a new 
engineering genus.  They offer the flexibility for additional 
capabilities, which manned systems or SoS are not capable 
of due to combined safety and effectiveness considerations.  
Autonomous, intelligent systems, and the operators within 
the SoS network, will execute outside of predictable, stable 
behavior within carefully optimized situations. In order to 
be useful to the warfighter, a UASoS must have the 
capacity for adaptation and change and be able to perform 
the unexpected no matter what mission it has to perform.  
 
2.1 Risks Associated with UASoS  
UASoS provide new challenges, which dictate very 
different developmental and operational testing than that 
required for traditional systems.  Currently, systems 
designed under traditional means are expected to perform 
predictable tasks in bounded environments and are 
measured against their ability to meet requirements, while 
UASoS function and operate in open, non-deterministic 
environments and are more focused on interactions between 
components, both manned and unmanned.  The 
interconnected parts have more properties, and control and 
operator interfaces can be drastically different.   
There are a number of other technical and organizational 
risks associated with testing UASoS, which we have 
divided into two categories: those which occur at the SoS 
level and those which affect the testing process.  Many of 
the SoS level risks and challenges have been identified by 
numerous researchers in the past; however, none of these 
past projects have focused specifically on the risks 
associated with testing SoS. [4, 5].  These risks are 
prioritized based on stakeholder responses in Section 4. 
 
System of System Level Risks: Many factors can increase 
the integration complexity of the SoS including the number 
of systems to be integrated, number of interfaces involved 
and technology maturity of the SoS.  Many UASoS have 
never even existed in the past making it very difficult to 
predict any emergent properties.  A UASoS requires the 
ability for manned and unmanned systems to co-operate 
with each other to fulfill its purpose.  In addition, the 
number of requirements of the SoS is a key driver of risk, 
as well as changes in requirements throughout SoS 
development and operation.  Many times it is unclear what 
the SoS needs to do in order to fulfill its mission and 
without the appropriate metrics to evaluate the performance 
of the UASoS, it is difficult to determine whether the 
mission is successful or not.  But, not only do requirements 
change within a mission setting; missions and operational 
platforms also change resulting in changing requirements to 
reflect the warfighter’s needs.  For example, the Brigade 
Combat Teams Modernization Program, formerly known as 
Future Combat Systems, is a typical SoS integrating a 
number of operational platforms, a versatile mix of mobile, 
networked systems that will leverage mobility, protection, 
information and precision.  To conduct effective operations 
across such a spectrum requires careful planning and co-
ordination of space, air, land domain platforms and 
networks, understanding of the SoS architecture and 
capabilities, as well as interoperability across all 
components of SoS.  Further, the individual systems within 
a SoS may have varying levels of maturity and may enter 
the SoS at different stages of the SoS lifecycle.  Ensuring 
that these systems can still work together and merging 
newer more advanced technologies with more traditional 
technologies can present a significant challenge to 
development and validation of the SoS.  In addition, the 
degree of autonomy of the individual systems can result in 
cost savings in some areas and additional costs in other 
areas.  From an operational perspective, it may be less 
costly to operate a set of systems with a higher degree of 
autonomy because the systems are more developed and 
capable of fulfilling the missions while maintaining safety 
to the warfighter.  From the development perspective, the 
higher the degree of autonomy, the more significant the 
costs especially when ensuring that the UAS meets its 
specified requirements and is capable of maintaining the 
safety of the warfighter.   
 
Testing and Network Risks:  Unmanageable combinatorial 
problems can result when a large number of tests need to be 
performed on a large number of systems, and especially in 
the DoD, there is need to prioritize tests to ensure the 
systems meet schedule requirements.  The type of test and 
amount of each type of test to be performed will also be a 
driver of costs.  For example,  field tests require 
considerable resources, labor, and scheduling, and is 
significantly more costly than a simulated test which can be 
done in a virtual environment.  While it is impossible to 
eliminate all risks through computer simulations; the more 
failure scenarios that can be predicted and tested in a 
simulated environment, the less costly it will be during the 
fielding process, especially in the case of communication 
failures and loss of equipment.  Multisite coordination for 
testing also becomes an issue especially when multiple 
stakeholders are involved and individual systems are 
located in many different places.  Testing systems in 
specific domains can also be difficult especially in the 
space and undersea arenas which are primarily UAS 
  
environments and access becomes exponentially more 
difficult and expensive.  As UAS are merged with other 
systems to form SoS, there is need for a better 
understanding of the risks associated with testing in 
multiple domains as well as the platforms necessary to 
ensure effective testing in space, air, land, sea and undersea 
domains at once.   When systems are integrated, it is 
difficult to predict how the test process needs to adapt to 
account for emergent properties, especially when dealing 
with UAS as these place additional demands on effort, 
scheduling, and budgeting.  The maturity level of the test 
which defines how mature the test and test process are, can 
influence the ability of a test to predict whether the SoS has 
met its expected requirements and capabilities. 
 
2.2 Future of T&E of UASoS 
Testers and evaluators have much work to do develop 
test procedures, develop test facilities, and develop 
evaluation methods and criteria to address the unique 
characteristics, operation, and missions of unmanned 
systems.  There needs to be a move away from traditional 
boundary lines placed between developmental testing (DT) 
and operational testing (OT).  Currently, developmental 
testing entails identifying the technical capabilities and 
limitations, assessing the safety, identifying and describing 
technical risk, assessing maturity, and testing under 
controlled conditions.  Operational testing is a fielding 
activity, measuring the capability of the system to perform 
in the field.  [6] On a SoS level, especially with a UASoS, 
both these spectrums of testing are required simultaneously 
and even existing programs currently do joint integration 
testing emphasizing the need for the involvement of both 
operational and developmental testing throughout the life 
cycle of the UASoS.  
Testing is a method of risk mitigation: but we must know 
why we are testing to determine what we should test, how 
long and how much effort is required.  By using a risk 
based testing approach, we identified the risks that need to 
be mitigated, and what priorities need to be made in the 
testing process based on these risks.  We will combine these 
results into a cost model, which we will use to estimate the 
amount of test effort required for a given level of 
confidence.  The remainder of this paper focuses on our 
progress thus far in developing the model, based on inputs 
from stakeholders within the DoD and other cost estimation 
techniques.   
 
3 The Cost Estimation Approach 
A parametric cost model is defined as a group of cost 
estimating relationships used together to estimate entire 
cost proposals or significant portions thereof. These models 
are often computerized and may include many interrelated 
cost estimation relationships, both cost-to-cost and cost-to-
non-cost. [7] The use of parametric models in planning and 
management serves as valuable tools for engineers and 
project managers to estimate effort.   
While cost models have not been specifically applied to 
testing and evaluation in the past, they have been an 
essential part of DoD acquisition since the 1970s.  
Hardware models were first to be developed and were 
followed by software models in the 1980s.  Various cost 
models have subsequently been developed to focus on 
specific categories of systems; however none of them have 
been singled out for the testing and evaluation phase of the 
system life cycle.  In fact, previous studies on systems 
engineering cost models have shown that developers are so 
convinced that T&E is such a small proportion of the total 
life cycle cost, that much more emphasis is placed on the 
cost of the other phases of the life cycle as opposed to T&E.  
[8] However, further analysis of T&E in the SoS 
environment with recent reports of unexplained behaviors 
in complex systems (e.g., Lexus cars speeding out of 
control) are leading experts to re-evaluate these ideas.  [9] 
From a warfighters’ perspective, testing UASoS is 
absolutely critical and in fact because many of these 
systems are being fielded for the first time and testing is so 
integrated with both development and operations, T&E 
contributes significantly to the cost of the system especially 
given the risks and uncertainties associated with UASoS. 
This coupled with the fact that during the initial testing, 
finding and fixing problems after delivery is often 100 
times more expensive than finding and fixing it during the 
requirements and design phase, makes an accurate cost 
estimation tool even more necessary in the DoD.  [10] 
The budget, both in terms of cost and effort, is currently 
determined based on similar projects that have been 
conducted in the past, coupled with extrapolations to 
account for the new system under test.  However, UASoS 
do not have a significant history, but are in such high 
demand that there is the need to understand how much 
effort is required for testing.   
Testing is often reduced to a purely technical issue 
leaving the close relationship between testing and business 
decisions unlinked and the potential value contribution of 
testing unexploited.  [11] There comes a point at which the 
amount of effort invested does not minimize risk at a 
justifiable rate.  Neither does it offer enough of a return on 
the amount of resources invested into the test.  We take into 
consideration the notion that all risks can never be 
eliminated, though a valuable effort can be made to 
significantly reduce the impacts of the risks of UASoS. We 
are developing a methodology to determine what the 
optimal test stopping point should be and how to estimate 
when that stop point has been reached. 
 
3.1 Related Cost Modeling Work and their 
limitations for UASoS T&E 
Today, there are fairly mature tools to support the 
estimation of the effort and schedule associated with 
UASoS T&E. For software development activities, there 
are the COCOMO II, Cost Xpert, Costar, PRICE S, SLIM, 
and SEER-SEM cost models.  At the single system level, 
there is the Constructive Systems Engineering Model, 
  
COSYSMO, to estimate the system engineering effort and 
for definition of the SoS architecture, the solicitation and 
procurement process for the SoS components, and the 
integration of the SoS components into the SoS framework 
there is the Constructive System-of-Systems Integration 
Cost Model, COSOSIMO.  [9] 
But, while COSOSIMO addresses the development of a 
SoS and normative integration and testing in the SoS 
environment, there has been little work done with respect to 
the needed evolution of SoS T&E (prescriptive) or the 
evaluation of the flexibility and emergent behaviors of 
complex systems and SoS (adaptive limits).  How do you 
know when testing is done and you have minimized 
sufficient risk so that the SoS is safe for deployment in the 
field?   Li et al propose a value-based software testing 
method to better align investments with project objectives 
and business value.  [11] This method could provide 
decision support for test managers to deal with resource 
allocation, tradeoff and risk analysis, and time to market 
initiatives and software quality improvement and 
investment analysis.  While Li’s value based testing 
techniques do give a good foundation on which we can 
build our methodologies, this method is more applicable for 
business critical projects focused on return on investment 
and not suitable for safety critical domains. It also requires 
detailed cost estimation to assist the test planner and does 
not account for emergent properties as those frequently 
found in UASoS. From a warfighter’s perspective, a risk 
based testing approach may be more relevant as it focuses 
resources on those areas representing the highest risk 
exposure.  Li also applies a costing methodology which 
defines costs of tests relative to each other as opposed to the 
absolute cost of test.  PATFrame methodology attempts to 
calculate the absolute cost of test rather than relative cost 
because this will allow us to estimate and predict what 
strategies can be used to optimize the test process on a case 
by case basis.   
In a paper entitled “Managing your way through the 
integration and test black hole”, George also tries to address 
both testing and integration from a software perspective. 
[12] She claims that the integration testing phase is a black 
hole, which the systems never seem to escape.  George 
calculates integration effort as a product of the number of 
predicted defects and the average time to find and fix a 
defect plus the product of number of test cases and the 
average time to run a test case.  While this is a very simple 
model and could be expanded to other phases of a life cycle 
as opposed to just software testing, it assumes that the main 
problem with integration testing is defects.  We build on 
George’s process, as using only defect analysis can be very 
limiting since there are a number of other cost drivers 
which define the stopping point of a test.  In fact, in a recent 
workshop, representatives from the army indicated that 
“defects” are not of that much of a concern in the SoS 
environment, but rather identification and evaluation of 
emergent behaviour is of more importance. 
George also assumes that we know what these defects 
are, can find them easily, and can estimate the amount of 
effort to remove the defects.  For UAS, we need to not only 
be able to identify and understand these single-system 
defects but also have a firm grasp of the risks involved in 
integrating multiple UAS to form a complex system of 
systems, and determining the cost drivers associated with 
those risks.   
We also intend on expanding on the fundamental 
methods presented by Aranha and Borba to include the 
complexity and sizing of tests for UASoS.   Their work 
attempted to estimate the size of a software test which is 
required to determine the test execution effort.  This is 
because test managers have difficulties using existing cost 
models, since the effort to execute tests are more related to 
the characteristics of the tests rather than characteristics of 
the software.  Their method focuses on using the 
specifications of the test to determine the size and 
complexity, which is used as an input for test execution 
effort estimation models.  [13] Such methodology is very 
relevant to us because as a UASoS increases in size so does 
the testing complexity and thus the required test effort.  We 
begin with the UASoS and calculate the test effort based on 
the complexity of the SoS.   
However, whereas test size is defined as the number of 
steps required to complete the test, and the complexity is 
defined as the relationships between the tester and the 
tested product, we must take many more factors into 
consideration to determine the size and complexity of 
UASoS.  These range from the number of requirements of 
the SoS, to the interactions between individual systems, 
individual systems at various levels of maturity, operation 
platform diversity, maturity level of the test given emergent 
UASoS, etc. There are also organizational factors that can 
increase the complexity of the interactions between 
systems, including understanding of the integration 
requirements depending on how well defined they are, the 
number of organizations or individual stakeholders 
managing the systems, understanding the overall 
architecture of the SoS etc.   
 
3.2  Cost Model Development Methodology 
 To derive good cost estimating relationships from 
historical data using regression analysis, one must have 
considerably more data points than variables; such as a ratio 
of 5 to 1.  [7] It is difficult to obtain actual data on testing 
and evaluation costs and the factors that influence these 
costs especially when programs of record do not exist.  
Therefore, we have embarked on the Seven Step Modeling 
Methodology created by Barry Boehm and used for a 
number of cost estimation models  [14].  
      Step 1: Analyze existing literature 
      Step 2: Perform Behavioral analysis 
      Step 3: Identify relative significance 
      Step 4: Perform Expert Judgment, Delphi Analysis 
      Step 5: Gather Project Data 
      Step 6: Determine Bayesian A-Posteriori Update 
      Step 7: Gather more data: Refine model 
  
  For Steps 1 and 2, we have used the interpretivist 
approach, which focuses on complexity of human sense 
making as the situation emerges. It enables us to learn as 
much as possible about UASoS T&E and arrive at 
qualitative conclusions as to the most important factors. 
The interpretivist approach was used when developing the 
size and cost driver definitions with the PATFrame group 
and affiliates.  Through a series of interviews, surveys, and 
working group meetings we identified and defined the most 
significant drivers of cost. We had to ensure that there was 
credibility in establishing a match between the constructed 
realities of UASoS T&E and the respondents, and confirm 
that these cost drivers were grounded in the theory of cost 
estimation as well as testing and not just a product of our 
imagination.  Steps 3 and 4 are ongoing, and the remaining 
steps will be tackled as the project progresses.   
We have begun collecting the opinions of experts 
involved in the T&E of UASoS on the initial technical and 
organizational cost drivers we identified as inputs to our 
cost model.   Everyone we interviewed or solicited ideas 
from has been involved in the T&E process for at least 10 
years, either as a tester, test engineer, test planner, evaluator 
or program manager.  We have received the responses from 
10 survey respondents so far.  They were asked to rate the 
identified risks on a scale of 1 to 5, with 5 having the 
greatest impact on the effort required for UASoS T&E and 
1 having the smallest impact.  We gathered their inputs to 
help prioritize our cost drivers, which are a combination of 
factors affecting SoS, individual systems and the testing 
process.  In addition, we gathered feedback on what drivers 
need to be changed, reworded, eliminated or added. 
 
4 Cost Driver Prioritization 
The following charts represent the inputs of subject 
matter experts in the area of testing and evaluating 
unmanned and autonomous systems of systems.  A score 
that is 3.5 and above represents a high impact driver, 2.5 to 
3.49 represents a driver of medium impact and a driver with 
a rank below 2.5 is a low impact driver.  Figure 1 shows the 
responses to the technical drivers presented to respondents 
and the average score rating for each driver.   
Our results confirm our hypothesis that the T&E 
community prioritizes tests based on how complex the task 
is.  Number of systems, integration complexity, number of 
requirements, technology maturity, synchronization 
complexity, requirements changes test complexity and 
diversity are all rated very high in their impacts on effort 
for SoS testing.  Power availability was rated with least 
impact and conversations with respondents confirm that 
power issues can be easily remedied as opposed to the other 
factors that need to be considered.   Additional cost drivers 
identified include emergent behaviours, data analysis tool 
capabilities and instrumentation requirements and changes.   
Figure 2 shows the responses to the organizational 
drivers presented to respondents and the average score 
rating for each driver. 
 
From the organizational perspective we see that 
understanding of the SoS requirements and architecture as 
well as the personnel availability and capability are rated as 
higher cost drivers compared to multisite coordination of 
stakeholder team cohesion.  “Time constraints” is the most 
significant organizational driver of cost in T&E of UASoS.  
  










5.     Conclusion 
In this paper, we have addressed the need for better 
testing and evaluation tools of unmanned and autonomous 
systems of systems and presented the Prescriptive and 
Adaptive Testing Framework as one of the tools which will 
take into consideration the risks and costs surrounding the 
complexity of emerging UASoS.  There comes a point at 
which the amount of effort invested in testing to minimize 
the risk of the SoS is significantly greater than the rate at 
which risk is minimized and does not provide enough of a 
return on the amount of resources invested into the test.  
Therefore it is necessary to understand how much testing is 
enough to deem a SoS safe.  The work presented here is just 
the beginning of the development of a cost and risk model 
for UASoS T&E to address this problem.  We highlight the 
limitations of applying existing cost models to the testing 
process of UASoS and propose a new model which takes 
into consideration both risks and costs involved in UASoS 
testing.  One of the important elements is ensuring that the 
definitions of the drivers are consistent so they can be rated 
from similar perspectives.  We presented the prioritization 
of both technical and organizational cost drivers.  We note 
that all drivers associated with time constraints, integration 
and complexity, understanding of architecture and 
requirements are rated highly, while those regarding 
stakeholders and team cohesion are rated as medium.  We 
will continue to develop this model based on continued 
investigation into the test and evaluation process of the 
DoD, the inputs from subject matter experts, and the 
quantitative and qualitative data from ongoing projects to 
be used for our parametric model development.  In future 
work, we will assign appropriate ratings to the cost drivers 
as identified by our testing experts in the DoD field, and 
present a cost model to determine the effort required for 
testing.  
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